
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LEBANON-LIBYA

The governor of Lebanon's central bank told Ambassador Godley Wednesday that Libya moved more than \$35 million into Lebanon during May and that Libyan funds continue to arrive at a rate of approximately \$1 million a day. The amounts are far in excess of Libya's commercial or diplomatic needs in Lebanon.

Libya uses the money to support a variety of leftist, Muslim, and radical fedayeen organizations in Lebanon. These groups, located primarily in the cities, were responsible for keeping the civil disturbances going in Beirut.

President Qadhafi hopes to destroy Lebanon's system of power-sharing between Christians and Muslims; in practice, the system has worked to ensure Christian dominance of the government and army. Qadhafi would prefer a radical Muslim government that would abandon Lebanon's policy of coexistence with Israel and provide active support for the fedayeen.

The Libyan embassy in Beirut buys news coverage favorable to Libya's radical policies; it has bought outright at least four Beirut newspapers.

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SOUTH KOREA

President Pak's emergency decree last month has been followed by a series of firm measures to end political dissent and reinforce security precautions.

The war scare in Seoul last month, fanned by events in Indochina and Kim II-song's trip to Peking, has eased as a result of Kim's shift to a more moderate propaganda pitch, the US response to the Mayaguez incident, and strong reassurances of US support. But Pak remains uneasy about North Korean intentions and about whether the US will provide the kind of military backing he wants in all contingencies.

Emergency Measure 9, issued on May 13, was only Pak's opening salvo. That decree banned criticism of the present authoritarian constitution, prohibited all political activity by students, and severely curbed the press. Since then the government has announced that:

- --All university students will be organized into quasi-military units. Freshmen will be given ten days of concentrated training at military camps and nearly all students will be required to attend drills for four hours per week.
- --Tight censorship will be imposed on all entertainment media in an effort to eliminate anything deemed harmful to national unity or morals.
- --A national civil defense corps is planned, with mandatory participation, which would bring virtually all males from age 17 to 50 under some direct form of military discipline.

The Pak regime is also soliciting businesses for contributions to the national defense fund, developing plans for additional reserve forces to be formed in the event of mobilization, and organizing large rallies proclaiming the country's readiness to defend "to the death" against any northern attack.

Pak has taken the initiative almost completely away from his traditional political opponents. A brief student flare-up in late May was quickly and firmly suppressed. Christian activism has subsided, in part because of intimidation by government security agents.

The major opposition party leader, Kim Yong-sam, held a well-publicized meeting with President Pak last month to underscore national unity against the North. Kim subsequently spoke out for democratic reforms in order to reaffirm his oppositionist credentials, but he moderated his demands.

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A major advantage for Pak is the fact that most of his political adversaries are now publicly committed to his militant anti-communism, and many are also concerned about Pyongyang's intentions.

The government is pressing the line that Kim II-song's recent moderate statements are merely part of a false peace offensive aimed at isolating South Korea internationally and that North Korea still harbors aggressive designs. As a result, Pak's opponents are reluctant to mount vigorous protests for fear of appearing unpatriotic and because they would face harsh government retaliation.

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PANAMA

With Argentina withdrawing its bid to fill the upcoming vacancy on the UN Security Council in favor of Panama, the Panamanian government has scored a significant success in its campaign to rally support for a new canal treaty. Panama's accession to the Security Council would provide the government with an especially useful vantage point from which to advance its canal treaty objectives and to press the US for movement in the negotiations.

The move, made public in Panama City last week, represents an important advance and virtually assures Panama's election to the seat. Few observers in Panama expected Buenos Aires to give in so easily. Prior to the recent round of visits by high-level Panamanian delegates to the other Latin American heads of state, Argentina had been expected to win the seat with little difficulty.

Argentina's withdrawal will strengthen the position of Panamanian leader, General Torrijos, vis-a-vis his detractors in the press and will especially enhance the stature of Juan Tack in his role as chief canal treaty negotiator. According to a decree signed by General Torrijos and released Thursday, Juan Tack will temporarily relinquish his Foreign Minister's portfolio to apply full attention to a new canal treaty. Foreign Affairs Vice Minister Carlos Ozores will assume the post of foreign minister in the interim. Although the official resolution will temporarily settle speculation as to whether Juan Tack has actually been removed from the Foreign Ministry, his eventual return to the post remains very much in question. General Torrijos has recently been displeased with the overall attitude and certain activities of his deputy and could well decide—as frequently reported in the past—to remove him permanently.

Meanwhile, official government spokesmen continue to keep canal treaty
negotiations in the public eye. They have reiterated Panama's desire to resolve the
matter with the US expeditiously, specified basic demands and hinted at negative
developments which could ensue if problems are not resolved.

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L	JAPAN: Tokyo has decided to postpone Lower ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until	House deliberations on the next Diet session. The

decision was largely tactical; if the Lower House passed the treaty and the Upper House was unable to take final action within the remaining two weeks of the current session—a prospect ruling party leaders considered likely—then ratification

procedures would have had to start from scratch in the future.

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